APPLICATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN CHINA STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM : By case study of Greenland Group by Bian Qiao
	  <MBA Degree Thesis> 
AY 2015 
 
APPLICATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN CHINA 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM  
By case study of Greenland Group 
 
35132325-5  BIAN QIAO 
FINANCIAL STRATEGIES AND CAPITAL MARKET 
C.E. PROF. NOBUHIKO HIBARA 
D.E. PROF. SHIGERU NISHIYAMA   D.E. PROF. JYOSHIKI MANO 
 
 
Summary 
 
The purpose of this paper is to research the meaning of the fourth round of China state-owned 
enterprises reform and the effects of involving private equity participating into the reform process. A 
typical state-owned real estate enterprise Greenland Group has been chosen as the simple of the case 
study because its reform includes two main contents (mixed-ownership and overall listing) of the 
current round SOE reform. In-depth interviews were conducted with high relevant officers from 
Greenland Group and Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. 
This paper focuses on researching the purpose of the current round of SOE reform and the impacts 
of private equity participating into the reform. This round of SOE reform is a necessary action for 
China’s economy transition, it would improve sate enterprises’ corporate governance, optimize 
SOEs’ shareholding structure, release enterprises’ vitality and competitiveness by reducing 
government’s administration interference on corporate operation. For Greenland Group, the 
mixed-ownership reform would break up the old order in management and improve corporate’s  
marketization process, so that make corporate decision making become more scientific, independent 
and flexible. Meanwhile, implementing the reverse merger transection is a triple-win for the 
government, PE firms and Greenland employee shareholding committee, that they would enjoy 
approximately six to seven times market value appreciation. The reasons for involving private equity 
firms rather than other investment institutions are that PE is more competitive in giving strategic 
	  advices since private firms generally have more professional manager teams with  rich and 
professional capital and corporate operation experience. Private equity would contribute to helping 
conservative state enterprises build modern corporate system, diversifying and monitoring the board 
of directors, improving corporate management incentive and salary systems, and providing SOEs 
value-added service based on their global vision and resources. At last, the author pointed out there 
was no foreign investment institutions won the bids for becoming major shareholders in state 
enterprises, so are there any provisions about prohibiting foreign capital joining in SOEs? The 
government claims that there is no prohibition or discrimination on foreign capital participating into 
China SOE reform. However, the reality reveals another view, it seems that the government 
determinates to complete this reform process without foreign capital and let domestic investors take 
the biggest piece of cake intentionally, even at a lower price. In Sinopec’s case, the oil retail unit was 
sold to domestic investment institutions at 20% lower price than the expectation price. This paper is 
one of the very few studies that researches about the current round China SOE reform and integrates 
private equity’s impacts on the reform procedure.   
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CHARPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
China has over 150,000 state-owned enterprises controlled by central and local government, and a 
majority of SOEs distributed in pillar industries, which have economical or political priorities such 
as oil, electricity and transportation. China has implemented three rounds of state-owned enterprise 
reforms during the transition process from planned economy to market economy, and SOEs are 
keeping update their operational mechanism to modern corporate system step by step through reform 
procedure. So far, there are still some noticeable problems existing in state enterprises such as 
mismanagement, inefficient, and less profitability compared with non-state enterprises—a 5% 
profitability gap existing between SOEs and private companies. Meanwhile, the government 
published the China Manufacturing 2025, it is a Chinese version “Industry 4.0” action plan, and 
“Internet Plus” strategy, which is integrating internet technologies with manufacturing and business, 
is also pursuing as a new strategy by the government aiming to make China update from “big 
industrial contrary” to “powerful industrial contrary” (www.usito.org/news, 2015). Thus, China is in 
an economy transition period right now, and it is necessary to promote another round of SOE reform 
to resolve the existing problems and improve SOEs corporate governance to adapt the more 
competitive market in the future.  
 
The current round of SOE reform focuses on accelerating state assets exiting from SOEs, promoting 
SOEs’ mixed-ownership shareholding structure, improving corporate governance and overall listing 
on stock market. More importantly, a noticeable characteristic in this round of reform is involving 
private equity participating into the reform process, which is a new attempt for China’s government. 
Academic papers mostly made research on previously China SOE reform, while very few focus on 
the current reform that started from 2014, let alone integrating PE’s impacts on the reform, thus this 
is the reason that the author made this research.  
 
Scholars such as Mok and Chau’s(2003) claim partial privatized enterprises have more efficiency 
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than solely state enterprises, then whether mixed-ownership reform would generate same effects on 
SOEs? Prior researches choose variables such as profitability and debt ratio to examine the impacts 
of partial privatization on corporates, however, besides of these quantifiable figures, what kinds of 
other influences that mixed-ownership can bring to state enterprises?  Private equity has been 
confirmed can increase corporate’s performance by Jensen(1989), Kaplan(1989) and many other 
researchers, while how and whether PE firms can benefit reforming SOEs is still a problem because 
of SOEs’ complex shareholding structure. Qiao(2007) cites that introducing foreign private equity 
firms would broader financing channels  and encourage implementing advanced corporate 
governance theories and help state enterprises overall listing in stock markets. Therefore, what is the 
government’s attitude on involving foreign capital participating the reform? Are they welcomed or 
prohibited? This is a reform that just began and has many innovations compared with previous 
reforms, thus in this paper the above questions will be researched. 
 
Greenland Group is chose as a case study here because it is a famous typical SOE which has 
diversified business expended overseas, meanwhile, it implemented both mixed-ownership reform 
and reverse merger during the reform, therefore, this Group is a perfect simple to study the research 
questions. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the reform and PE’s effects on 
corporate governance, the author interviewed high relevant officers from both Greenland Group and 
Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.  
 
In this paper, the perspectives of promoting SOE reform are illustrated from both the enterprise’s 
side and government’s side. The government hopes will improve state assets liquidity that exiting 
from SOE smoothly, and reduce administration interferences on state enterprises generally, leave 
enterprises making decisions indecently and be responsible to their profits and losses rather than 
relying on governments subsidies and monopoly market shares. The government expects this reform 
will improve SOEs become more marketable, professional and competitive. Meanwhile, on SOE’s 
side, this reform is supposed to diversify shareholding structure, breaks up the old order in 
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management making their operational decisions more scientific, independent and flexible. In 
addition, the benefits of Greenland’s reverse merger on capital market are also calculated in this 
study. The effects of private equity participating into SOE reform are specifically illustrated in this 
paper. According to the Greenland’s view that PE shareholders, as strategic investors with rich 
experience and professional manager teams, would monitor the board of director, provide strategic 
advices, help the Group optimize management incentive and salary system. Furthermore, PE firms’ 
global vision and resource would benefit Greenland Group expending overseas business. The foreign 
capital participation problem is also discussed in this research, through the government’s official 
attitude states foreign capital is very welcomed to participating into the reform, there are still some 
concerns existing there, more details will be presented later.  
 
The contents are organized as follow. Chapter 2 illustrates an overall introduction of state-owned 
enterprises reform, Chapter 3 reviews theories of private equity’s impacts on corporate governance 
and reform. The case study of Greenland Group is presented in Chapter 4 and the conclusion and 
limitation of this paper followed in Chapter 5.  
 
CHARPTER 2 OVERALL INTRODUCTION OF CHINA     
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM 
Section 1. Previous state-owned enterprise reforms 
1978 is definitely a significant year in China’s economy history. The Third Plenary Session of the 
11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, which decided to open China’s 
economy to the outside world and started the reform from planned economy to market economy 
(Moore&Wen, 2006). Reforms can be mainly separated into three rounds. The first round SOE 
reform was during 1978-1992, the government loosened control on SOE managerial autonomy, 
pushed the separation of ownership and managerial autonomy, which were totally belonged to the 
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government before, and launched contractual management responsibility system to incent SOE 
maximum gains through profit sharing policy.  
 
The second round reform started from 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour speech significantly 
accelerated the speed of the SOE reform. With Deng’s famous quotation “It doesn't matter if a cat is 
black or white, so long as it catches mice”, China had no longer debated about whether the reform 
policies were socialist or capitalist, “socialist market system” (SSB, 1995) had become the new 
economy development goal. Business strategies and operation decisions could be decided by SOEs’ 
own and these corporates began to be responsible for their own gains or losses, which encouraged or 
even forced those conservative SOEs participated in the fierce competition in market economy. Till 
2002, China spent 10 years on building modern corporate system(Cho&Huang, 2012).  
 
From 2003 to 2013 was the third round reform that focused on enhancing the reform of SOE 
property rights system. In order to better manage and supervise SOE assets, State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established in 2003. The government 
and SASAC kept promoting SOE strategic reorganization and joint-stock system reform, and 
improve SOE bankruptcy regulation and law to completion. The modern corporate system was 
preliminary complicated during the tem years. The chart below is a simple summery of the history of 
SOE reform. The table showed in next page presents main contents of previous state-owned 
enterprise reforms. 
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Table 1 Main contents of previous state-owned enterprise reforms 
 
Section 2. Status quo and problems of China stated-owned enterprise reform  
Three rounds of market-oriented SOE reforms have made profound influences on China’s growth 
prospects. According to the Ministry of Finance’s report, by the end of 2013, over 90% of the SOE 
had completed shareholding reform; 378 SOEs financed RMB1514.5 billion through being listed on 
stock market; 57% of central State-Owned Enterprises (directly managed by the central government) 
had introduced private capital as shareholders to improve the mixed-ownership structure reform; 
those previous reforms broke SOE’s conservative and low efficiency operation system, greatly 
released the vitality of private capital and stimulated the development of national capital market, as a 
consequence, China stock market had reached the peak in bull market in 2001 and 2007 respectively.  
 
Financial performance is generally used to evaluate whether a reform is successful. The return on 
assets were increasing steadily since 2000 for both state and private enterprises, although the 
economy suffered a crush caused by the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese enterprises rebounded back 
rapidly less then two years. Furthermore, it was interesting that the ROA differences between state 
1978-1992 • Separated the SOEs’ ownership and managerial autonomy. 
• Expanded SOEs’ managerial autonomy on operating decisions. 
• Launched contractual management responsibility system and profit sharing policy. 
1992-2002 • Built modern corporate system.  
• Stated property right reform, privatized parts of small and medium SOEs, 
encouraged diversifying property right and ownership of medium and large SOEs. 
2003-2013 • Established the SASAC to enhance the management and supervision of state-owned 
assets. 
• Promoted SOE shareholding reform and accelerated marketization process.  !
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and non-state firms mattered less before the financial crisis, after that an approximately 5% gap 
generated between SOEs and private firms. During the financial crisis, Chinese small and medium 
enterprises suffered great losses and plenty of SMEs went bankruptcy. The survivors kept seeking 
industrial transformation initiatively, from labor-intensive manufacturing to high value-added 
industry, while it was hard for those large-size state enterprises to do the update and transformation 
in short time, and some of them could only relied on the government subsidies to maintain daily 
operation instead of bankruptcy, therefore the state firms kept legging behind the private firms’ 
performance. 
Chart 1. Comparison of financial performance between SOEs and private firms 
                  
In the long term, the remarkable improvement of SOEs’ performance was benefited by policy 
favoritism that ensured state enterprises taking the “strategic heights” of the economy (Zhang 
&Freestone, 2013). Private enterprises are restricted to entry into a wide rage of industries which are 
“strategically important”, such as utilities service, petrochemical engineering and military 
industry(World Bank, 2012). Moreover, state enterprises stand in a better position in the market 
comparing with private firms, including government subsidies, low effective tax rates and resource 
extraction royalties(Huang, 2010). Indeed, SOEs enjoyed a privileged status in certain monopolistic 
markets created by the government, however, their performance even lagged behind private firms, 
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indicating that the reform has not completed yet, there are still serious problems existing in state 
enterprises.   
 
Monopoly of state owned shares is the most noticeable problem in state enterprises. As the largest 
shareholder of a SOE, state assets surprisingly have the least control power because there is no 
specific person in charge; corporate supervisors are only agent sponsors of state assets and they 
focus on administrative appraise rather than maximum efficiency and profitability. Furthermore, 
although a majority of state enterprises went IPO to deepen the shareholding reform and diversify 
the property rights, the monopoly of state owned shares problem has not been resolved at all, not 
even improvement, because there are larger amount of non-tradable shares in a SOE shareholding 
structure, the rest of tradable shares merely account for a small portion of the whole system, 
indicating that those market investors actually have little influence on the board’s decision making, 
the corporate governance is exactly the same way as before, then what would be the meaning for 
implementing shareholding reform? In addition, state enterprises’ monopolistic status in certain 
industries has hindered the developing of marketization economy and the building of modern 
corporate system. “Value creation” is the core variable to measure the performance of modern 
companies, and “value” is created through investing and manufacturing. However, for some 
monopolistic enterprises with incredible profitability, for example China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec Group), it was hard to tell that its enormous earnings are gained through excellent 
corporate governance or its monopolistic status in resource extraction. If the profits are rely on the 
monopolistic status, then meaning of establishing the appraisal mechanism of modern corporate 
system is doubtable.  
 
Section 3. The current round of state-owned enterprises reform 
China’s new round of SOE reform started from 2014, and the Third Plenum, which was held in 
November 2014, set up the agenda for the current round of state enterprises reform aiming to 
increase SOEs’ efficiency and attracting more private capital investments. According to an official 
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report of the UK government, by the end of first half of 2014, one third of central state enterprises 
claimed losses or earnings decline(www.gov.uk). Besides the underperformance, the profitability 
gap between state and private firms still exists, therefore, the most important content of current SOE 
reform plan is promoting mixed-ownership strategy, attracting private investors participating into 
corporate operation and market competition, that not only encourage companies increasing 
productively, but also provide a new financing way for local governments to get rid of their debts 
after the crack down on local government debt (www.gov.uk).  
 
Marketization is the main point of this round of state enterprise reform, on internal corporate 
governance side, improving management efficiency through establishing equity incentive system, 
introducing strategic investors and overall listing on stock market; on external side, implementing 
mixed-ownership reform, improving corporate reorganization and stimulating state assets exiting 
from state enterprises.  
Chart 2 Main contents of the marketization orientated State-Owned Enterprise reform 
 
Marketization	  orientated	  SOE	  reform 
Capital      operation 
Developing	  mixed-­‐ownership	  economy 
Improving	  state	  assets	  liquidity 
Establishing	  state-­‐owned	  investment	  corporate  
Corporate 
 governance 
Overall	  listed 
（IPO,	  revers	  merger） 
ClassiMication	  reform	  for	  different	  categories	  enterprises 
Establishing	  effective	  incentive	  and	  restraint	  system 
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The central government has chosen six central SOEs as pilots to implement the reform plan showed 
in the chart above, they are: State Development and Investment Corporation, China National Cereals, 
Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation, China National Building Materials Group, China Energy 
Conservation and Environmental Protection Group, Xinxing Cathay International Group and China 
National Pharmaceutical Group(Gumede, 2015). In addition, local governments have already made 
some vigorous reform experiments ahead of time, for example, SINOPEC opened its downstream oil 
sales business to experiment mixed-ownership, and CITIC Group had listed on Hong Kong stock 
exchange as a whole through reverse merger. More researches and literature reviews about the main 
contents of the reform plan will be discussed in the following chapters.   
 
Section 4. Mixed-ownership reform 
Mixed-ownership economy, as the key point of this new round SOE reform, is not a new world 
because China has tried to diversify state corporates ownership since the second SOE reform. In 
1994, the central government published the policy that privatized a part of small and medium SOEs 
while still strictly controlled the large state enterprises, and the policy was summarized as “grasp the 
large and release the small”. For the current round SOE reform, diversified ownership policy is 
improved and implemented deeply, the mixed-ownership reform will started from those large state 
enterprises, especially which are considered as “strategically important” such as oil, transportation 
and telecommunication. The reform plan requires SOEs maintaining the influential status in the 
overall economy meanwhile withdrawing some competitive markets (Dusek et al, 2015). However, 
there is still an argue about whether SOEs should withdraw from competitive markets, some people 
claim that state enterprises should withdraw from those competitive industries, such as real estate 
and hospitality, and invest more in infrastructure construction; while others insist that there is no 
need for state firm to withdraw the competition as long as the government cancels preferential 
policies for SOEs. 80 projects from state-dominated industries such as energy, pharmacy and other 
industries have been selected to open to private investors. And soon afterwards six central state 
enterprises have been chosen as pilots for corporate the mixed-ownership reform.  
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For easier understanding, corporate mixed-ownership can be considered as partial privatization that 
allows private investors hold state enterprises’ shares which are usually solely state-funded before. It 
is hard for China to fully privatize state enterprises because of their large sizes and the government 
policy guidance. In the whole A-share stock market approximately half of the listed companies’ 
shares are effectively owned by the state(Sam, 2011). Meanwhile, SOEs have the duty to manage 
critical resources, preserve employment and improve regional development(Boardman et al, 1986 ). 
A similar pattern can also be found in Singapore, whose almost 60% GDP was attributed to 
State-Owned Enterprises, and part of the main state enterprises are partially hold by the government, 
hence this pattern could be a reference for China’s reform (United States and State Department, 
2001).  
 
The implementing of mixed-ownership reform would end up the situation that the director of board 
is wholly controlled by the state assigned managers, private shareholders would join into internal 
board and monitoring system and effect the operational decision making (Cragg &Dyck, 1999). A 
noticeable problem brought by the state sole ownership is that no manager would use his/her rights 
to monitor the behavior of the state enterprises because property right is not clear that diffuses to all 
social members and nobody has the right to deal with his/her shares, therefore, they have no pressure 
or incentives to improve efficiency(Alchian &Demsets, 1973). However, when private investors 
become shareholders, they have full rights to decide whether to buy or sell the shares, hence they 
have more incentives to stimulate the company to achieve better performance maximizing its 
profitability (Henry, 1999).     Megginson et al(2006) state that privatized companies are more 
profitable and efficient than state enterprises, through testing 3 years pre and post privatization 
performance and operating ratios and comparing with the country industry levels. Mok and 
Chau’s(2003) research also supports privatization benefits firm performance. They examine the data 
of companies listed in Hong Kong stock market and claim that partial privatized enterprises have 
more efficiency than state enterprises, although those SOEs are more profitable. On the other hand, 
there are other researchers drew opposite conclusions. Oum et al. (2006) made an empirical study on 
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116 airports found out solely state owned airports actually performed more efficient than those 
partial privatized airports. Boardman and Vining (1989) support this conclusion with a test result of 
500 firms in 1983.  
 
There are already some pioneers for the mixed-ownership reform, for example, China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation(Sinopec). Sinopec sold its 29.99% of its downstream oil sale and distribution 
business to 25 non-state institutions, including private equities, private firms and social welfare 
funds. This is a positive action for the privileged mega SOE to break the monopolistic market 
initially, and the private placement were significantly oversubscribed(Dusek et al, 2015). Another 
thing has to be mentioned that although foreign investors were invited to participate the biding, none 
of them won the bid. The Minister Li Keqiang determined to complete this round of reform almost 
without the supports of foreign capital, therefore, 96% of the biding asset was sold to mainland and 
Hong Kong institutions, even at a lower price than expected(Lin, 2014).   
 
Section 5. Reverse merger  
A fact we have to admit that although China’s economy has been developing in a high speed, the 
financial performance and efficiency of state enterprises have not increased in the same pace. 
Therefore, to be listed in the stock market is a proper way to extend financing channels; build 
modern corporate system, establish corporate image and improve the efficiency of enterprises. 
However, the government’s strictly IPO reviewing system makes it be a high cost long time process 
so that a lot of firms have to withdraw IPO choosing revers merger to go public instead. 
 
Reverse merger is an acquisition of a public firm by a private firm so that the private firm can go 
public and being the surviving public entity through a less time and expenses cost way. Unlike IPO, 
revers merger cannot help the company financing capital directly from stock market though the new 
listed firm can raise money through capital market later(Gleason et al,2005). The general process of 
reverse merger is that the private firm purchases control of the public firm, which is called “shell” 
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company, the private firm obtains a majority of the shares(above 51%) of the public firm, than 
merger it and control its board of directors.  
The motivation for companies choosing reverse merger, also known as “back door listing”, is mainly 
because it is a shorter, easier, and lower cost way to go public. Compared with IPO, reverse merger 
costs substantially less expensive. Ritter(1998) cites that 11% of the average gross spreads would be 
paid for the IPO, which contains underwriting, legal, auditing fees and etc. While the combined fees 
of reverse merger would only cost about 2.72% of the transaction value for the target company and 
acquires. In terms of time cost, a well-operated reverse merger can be closed in no longer than three 
months while a typical IPO generally takes six to nine months (Arellano-Ostoa &Brusco, 2002). 
When a firm decides to IPO, it has to withstand regular audits, information disclosure requirements 
and the supervision of SEC, hence it is possible that the firm fail the IPO procession, whereas revere 
merger can help companies to avoid these initial listing requirements, and access to the capital 
market through a “back door”(Arellano-Ostoa &Brusco, 2002; Frederick et al, 2008). In other words, 
IPO is more risky and uncertain, and reverse merger listing can be considered as a combination of 
two entities, once the target and acquire agreed, the deal has a high possibility of completion 
(Gleason et al,2005).  
 
Literatures indicate that reverse merger is more attractive to small companies, but why China’s large 
size state enterprises would like to choose reverse takeover? The regulators’ examining system 
might be the main reason. In order to root out the fraudulent statements, the companies, which apply 
listing, have to be closely examined their annual reports by underwriters and China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. And the listing requirements are quite strict, for example, three consecutive 
years of profitable is required while some of SOEs cannot meet this requirement. Furthermore, a 
backlog has been created since so many companies applied IPO and the examining system makes the 
whole listing process take longer time. In addition, for mostly of state enterprises, they dose not need 
to raise more capital through going public but to complete an organizational reform and build a 
modern corporate system. Therefore, reverse merger is a better choice for SOEs to go public.  
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An empirical case is that CITIC Group Corporation (Citic) listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
through subsidiary Citic Pacific in 2014. Citic is China’s biggest conglomerate, and it runs business 
involving financial service, energy, manufacturing, real estate and other fields in China and 
overseas(www.citic.com). Citic Pacific paid its parent company cash and issued shares for the parent 
assets transection. Meanwhile, it had to issue new shares to the market to fulfill the HK Stock 
Exchange requirement that a listed company should have a minimum public float of 15%(Levin, 
2014). Not only went listed in HK, but also moved its headquarter from Beijing to Hong Kong, Citic 
Group had make a good example for deepening China SOEs reform, to initiatively adopt a more free 
market and sound management mechanism in order to change the inefficiency and poor oversight of 
state enterprise.    
 
Section 6. Corporate governance reform  
Besides mixed-ownership and overall listing, corporate governance is also a main topic of the 
current round reform. And in order to accelerate establishing modern corporate system, this round of 
internal management reform contains three main aspects—equity incentive, salary system and 
professional managers engage mechanism. 
 
No proper incentive system is one of the principle reasons leading the low efficiency of state 
enterprises. State enterprises runs by the government, they are state assets, while in China state 
assets belong to all the national people legally, this ambiguous property right problem makes 
managers just be an “agent” to operate companies, therefore, no one really cares about the profits 
increase or inefficiency(Guo,2014). Now it is necessary to establish efficient incentive systems to 
improve the SOE performance.  
 
Stock grants has been generally selected as an incentive for managers, and prior researches shown 
that optimal equity incentives vary with companies’ characteristics(Demsetz &Lehn ,1985). 
Murphy(1998) claims that the higher stock-based compensation, the better firm financial 
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performance. Core and Guay’s(1999) study provide evidence for the efficiency of stock grants 
incentives. Guo(2014) states that in the case of using stock option incentive, managers would pay 
more attention on the future value creation rather than short-sight decisions, which would benefit the 
long-term development of the firm.  
 
Most state enterprises’ salary is generally low and fixed (expect some resource companies like 
Sinopec), which leads agency problem that managers focus on entrenching their power and privilege, 
longing for ‘Gray incomes’ rather than find out profit growing points (Guo,2014). The 
non-performance related salary system is not fair to employees who make more contribution to the 
firm, and less attractive salary would also cause the brain drain. Martocchio（2002）argues that 
strategic compensation should be part of the humane resource management system, emphasized the 
importance of relating staff performance and salary. Montemayor’s research (2003) consist with this 
theory and provides evidence for the inferior company performance is related with the lack of the fit 
between corporate stagey and efficient salary system.  
 
Furthermore, currently, the top managers of state enterprises are directly appointed by the 
government, usually they are government officials, who might lack of enough knowledge of 
operating a corporate, so it is hard to convince shareholders and the public that the manager is 
qualified to run the company(Lu,2009) Therefore, the next move of state enterprises human resource 
reform is adapt to professional manager market, reduce the government administrative intervention, 
introduce competition mechanism in order to incentive managers’ creativity and improve the 
corporate performance(Guo,2014).     
 
CHAPTER 3 EFFECTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY ON CORPORATE 
AND REFORM 
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Section 1. General impacts of private equity on corporate performance 
Private equity refers to an asset class that not quoted on public stock exchange, and it invests in 
unlisted companies through negotiated process (Bance,2002). The investment categories of private 
equity include leveraged buyout, venture capital, M&A and restructuring (Private equity and 
leveraged finance markets,2008). In the recent years, there is a substantial increase in private equity 
takeovers volumes, especially in China, so next we will discuss about the impacts of private equity 
on corporates performance. 
 
Prior researches have made substantial tests on the effects of private equity on corporate governance. 
Jensen(1989) cites that private equity can improve corporate performance through monitoring 
managers and restricting the use of free cash flow. Kaplan’s(1989) study confirms the performance 
increasing theory, he tested 76 management buyout firms during 1980 to 1986, and the results 
showed that main financial ratios, such as free cash flow and operating income, have all increased 
three years after the transaction. Moreover, in manufactory industry, private equity-invested 
companies experienced a significant productivity increase(Davis et al.2009). Private equity does not 
only have incentives in corporate short-term performance, but also results to a substantial increase in 
firm’s long-term innovation(Lerner,2008). Besides corporates experience better development, 
shareholders can enjoy the benefits brought by PE buyout as well, 40% premium has been received 
by shareholders of 177 UK buyout transections(Renneboog,2007). However, studies in the recent 
decade indicate that private equity does not ensure an increase in corporate profitability. Leslie and 
Oyer (2008) examined 144 LBO in the US during 1996 to 2004 and no evidence has been found to 
support private equity buyout would result more profitability. Guo et al(2009) state that there is no 
significant difference on operating performance of the buyout company.  
 
Private equity can also make contribution on reducing agency costs. The companies’ debt service 
payments generated by LBO ensure managers concentrate on operating business more effectively in 
order to avoid bankruptcy, rather than use addicted into building their own empire with companies’ 
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capital, so that to reduce agency costs by restricting the misallocation of free cash flow(Jensen,1989). 
Galai and Masulis(1976) demonstrates that for those managers who hold large equity positions have 
more incentives to reduce costs and make the firm performance better, because company 
performance and stock price are closely related, the highlighted sensitivity of stock price simulates 
managers to work harder on profitability improvement (Masulis&Thomas, 2009). 
 
Monitoring on board of directors after the acquisition transection is considered to result to the 
reduction of agency cost. The stronger financial incentives and internal reporting system lead to 
more strictly rights control so that reduce free rider problem(Cotter&Peck,2001). Incompetent senior 
executives will be quickly replaced by highly talented ones, and the “performance-sensitive 
compensation” stimulates managers to make greater efforts on improving corporate financial 
performance(Kalpan& Per Strömberg, 2009).  
 
An LBO usually requires the private company borrowing a large amount of capital to purchase the 
publicly held stocks, as a consequence, considerable debt serving obligations generated by this high 
leverage will bring tax deductions for the acquired company. Tax deductions bring benefits on free 
cash flow so that the capital can be used for company’s future growth and create more profits, 
therefore, Ronneboog and Simons(2005) even argue this might be a main reason for a buyout 
transection since these benefits can be forecasted and appropriated in the competitive market. 
 
Takeover defense is another impact that could be brought by private equity. When a target firm is 
facing hostile takeover, it may look for private equity fund to be an antitakeover defensing against 
the hostile takeover through privatization, especially through a management 
buyout(Lowenstein,1985). In the case that small and middle enterprises threatened by hedge funds, 
these firms have more motivation to make transection with private equity in order to avoid lose the 
control of company. Brav et al (2008)provide robust evidence for this theme, they claim private 
equity buyout frequently happened after firms are attempted by hedge funds. 
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For listed companies in the US, going private is a way to avoid paying expensive compliance costs 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Fidrmuc et al(2007) state that it is hard for those small public technology 
firms to afford the costly compliance fees after the Internet bubble in 2001, they had to choose going 
private when facing increasing compliance costs while declining in trading volume. However, 
Bartlett(2009) argue that costs might not be the cause for privatization because some taken private 
firms still provide reports for Sarbanes-Oxley Act restrictions. Leuz(2009) cites that the boom of 
private equity in the worldwide has no relationship with Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and he suggests more 
available capital for leveraged buyout might explain the increase of LBO activity. Another benefit 
brought by going private is no more public information disclosure, and this would save a lot time for 
managers to explain their actions to the public or make efforts on maintaining investor relations, 
furthermore, some sensitive information do not have to be disclosure to public 
investors(Masulis&Thomas, 2009). 
Section 2. Development of private equity in China 
Private equity does not have a long history in China, before 2004, venture capital is the main 
investment method, while recent years private equity experienced a boom with China’s incredible 
economic growth speed, till 2005, China has become the third largest private equity market in the 
world. 
 
Although the first venture capital fund was established in 1985, the rapidly increase of PE industry 
started from 2004. Some famous buyout cases completed by international PE fund, such as 
Blackstone and Carlyle, made examples for domestic private equity firms, and since then, domestic 
PE funds began developing rapidly. Because of the impact by 2008 financial crisis, foreign PE funds 
slow down their expansion speed in China, and in 2009, RMB funds issued by domestic PE firms 
first dominated the market. 
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Chart3 Deal volume in Greater China 2000-2013 
 
A surge can be found in 2011 but soon followed by a significant decline in deal volume caused by 
temporary IPO prohibition. With the lifted of the IPO ban, China’s investment market experienced 
an incredible increase, especially in venture capital market.  
 
Table 2 Deal and capital volume in VC/PE 2013-2014 
 Volume 2014 2013 
Venture Capital Deal 1360 683 
Capital $12.7 billion $4.7 billion 
Private Equity Deal 280 325 
Volume $34 billion $21.5 billion 
CVSource 2015 
We can see from Table2 that in 2014 venture capital investment volume almost tripled the 2013 
market, and although the deal volume has a slightly decline compared to 2013, the investment 
capital amount still increased than the last year.  
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Chart4 China VC market volume 2009-2014 
 
CVSource 2015 
Chart5 China PE market volume 2009-2014 
 
CVSource 2015 
The release of IPO ban and the burst of mobile Internet development contributed on the booming of 
VC/PE market in China. Another factor that drove the PE flourishing is limited access for investors 
into public market, in China’s vast economy, only a few markets are investable. And in terms of 
stock market, 75% of market capitalization is traded in A-Share market, where foreign investment 
capital is strictly controlled. Moreover, pension managers become more comfortable with private 
equity in recent years. By the end of 2012, China National Social Security Fund(NSSF) claimed its 
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private equity allocation by more than 50%, and had invested about $3.7billion, and there are 
substantial room for investment volume increase form pension fund. In additional, the long-term 
under-allocated in emerging markets would keep attracting foreign capital shifting to China in order 
to take the advantages of high speed economic growth(Private equity roundup — China, 2012).  
 
Section 3. Effects of private equity in the current round of SOE reform 
General effects of private equity have been deeply researched by prior scholars whereas what kind of 
role that PE can play in SOE reform is still a new topic.  
 
For corporate governance aspect, private equity not only plays a financial investor role to provide 
capital that needed during the reform procedure, but also as a strategic investor to participate into 
corporate operating and promote the establish of modern corporate system. Sinopec’s case has 
shown that private equity can make contribution on state enterprise missed-ownership reform 
through partial privatization, meanwhile, it can provide a channel for state assets smoothly existing 
from SOEs, effectively eases the great pressure brought by “reduction of state-owned shares” plan in 
securities markets. Ma(2010) demonstrates that the external force brought by private equity would 
break the inherent pattern of interests and improve state enterprises institutional change in order to 
meet the requirements for listing in stock market. Qiao(2007) cites that introducing foreign private 
equity firms would broader financing channels for state enterprises and promote SOEs’ ownership 
diversification. Furthermore, experienced private equity firms would encourage implementing 
advanced corporate governance theories and help state enterprises overall listing in stock markets.  
 
Nowadays, China is experiencing industry updating and transforming process, private equity is 
needed to help corporates complete M&A transections, meanwhile, PE funds can promote the 
development of firms at different stages(Wu, 2007). Wang and Zhao(2006)analyze the foreign PE 
participating in SOE reform problem, and claim that as strategic investors, foreign private equity 
firms can resolve some problems during the reform procedure in a certain degree. 
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In terms of industry integration, Liu and Liu(2008) argue that private equity can combine industry 
and capital advantages so that create more room for economic growth. Currently, establishing 
“Listed firm+PE” industry fund has been a big trend in China capital market, 133 industry funds 
have been set up in 2014 and 80% of industry funds size are ¥100-1000 million yuan. This kind of 
industry fund focus on making transactions in the listed firms’ manufacture chain, merger and 
acquires related firms in the listed companies’ up and down stream. The funds’ investments based on 
the strategic development plan of the listed firm in order to help them complete business expansion 
or transformation, especially on those traditional manufactory listed firms. Private equity firms hold 
the domain position in the industry funds investments, integrate sources and provide advices or 
financial supports for the M&A trisections.  
 
CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY OF GREENLAND GROUP REFORM 
Since this round of SOE reform just started last year, there is not enough qualified financial data for 
doing quantitative regression, furthermore, the deeper meaning and effects of the reform cannot 
merely evaluated by statistical results. Therefore, this paper will use qualitative method to research 
the problems about this reform. A case study is conducted and a typical famous state 
enterprise—Greenland Group has been chosen as the sample. I had in-depth interviews with 
Greenland’s top manager and Shanghai government officer in order to analyze the research 
problems— how private equity could participate into the SOE reform, details will be illustrated in 
Chapter 4.3 and Chapter4.4. 
Section 1. Introduction of Greenland Group 
As one of the largest state enterprises in China, Greenland Group is established in 1992 in Shanghai, 
and takes the 268th place in Fortune Global 500. Its business domain is real estate, and integrated 
development of related business, including finance, hospitality, energy and metro construction. 
Greenland Group’s projects cover 80 main cities in 29 provinces, and it plays a leader role in four 
construction area: ultra-high rise buildings, urban complex projects, high speed rail station and 
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industrial park. Greenland Group also operates expands its business worldwide, and successfully 
entered in the US, Russia, UK and Australia, and 13 cities in four continents. 
 
Chart 6 Greenland Overseas 
 
Source: www.greenlandsc.com 
 
Through Greenland Group has not went public in mainland China, “Greenland Hong Kong 
Holdings”(00337) has listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2013 through reverse merger, which 
provides experience for Greenland overall listed in China A-Share Exchange. By the end of 2014 
fiscal year, Greenland Group announced an operating income of ¥402.1 billion yuan and ¥24.2 
billion yuan profits. It is estimated that until 2020, the groups operating income and profits will 
reach ¥800 billion and ¥50 billion, respectively, meanwhile, the group will built itself into an 
outstanding international corporate and complete transforming from “China’s Greenland” to 
“World’s Greenland”（www.greenlandsc.com, 2015）.  
 
Greenland Group has become a conglomerate through 23 years’ development, it is like “Zaibatsu” in 
Japan that run business covered different industries. The business domain of Greenland is real estate 
and has been the leading operator in this industry, for intense, 23 ultra-high-rises in both China and 
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overseas have been constructed by Greenland and become landmarks of those cities. Owned 70 
hotels all over the world(including JW Marriott and Intercontinental Hotel), Greenland keeps 
expending the scale and enhance the strength in hospitality industry, at the meantime, the Group 
implements self-owned brand strategy and established its own luxury hotel brand 
“Primus” and a business brand called “The Qube”. The ambition of Greenland Group in financial 
industry is to realize a “Big Finance” concept that involving asset management, investment bank, 
loan firms and trust companies, and till 2014, the amount of its finance business has achieved 20 
billion yuan. Greenland’s energy business has been growing in an increditable speed and now the 
Group has owned a complete industry chain of coal and crude oil, from production to distribution. 
As we can see from the introduction that Greenland Group is a typical well-operated State-Owned 
Enterprise, and it chooses to reform initiatively in order to fully participate into the capital market 
making a good example of the SOE reform.  
Section 2. Brief illustration of Greenland Group’s reform 
The reform for a large conglomerate such as Greenland is a complex restructure process, and 
Greenland Group will complete mixed-ownership reform and overall listing through this major 
assets reorganization. The reform is divided into tree main steps.  
 
First step: Introduced private equity firms as public shareholders 
Before the reform, as a state enterprise, Greenland Group is owned by Shanghai State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) through its two wholly-owned subsidiary 
companies—Shanghai Real Estate Group and Shanghai Municipal Investment Group, and the rest 
part of shares belongs to Employee Stock Ownership Plan(ESOP). 
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Chart 7 Original shareholdings before the reform 
                    
According to China’s regulation, firm’s go listing procedure will be suspended if the public 
shareholding ratio is under 10% of all the equity amount, therefore, in order to complete overall 
listing smoothly, the first step of Greenland’s reform is introducing external investors. On 25th 
November, 2013, Greenland issued 2.1 billion shares at 5.62 yuan per share to the public, which 
took 20% proportion of overall equity amount. Five famous private equity firms won the bid and 
injected 11.802 billion yuan into Greenland Group to help it promote the reform, and thanks to these 
private equity shareholders, Greenland could smoothly move to the next step of the restructure and 
not worried about being suspended listing process because of lacking public shareholdings.  
Chart 8 Shareholdings of five private equity firms 
                
Source: ifeng.com 
Second step: Establish Shanghai Gelinlan Company 
In order to protect the shareholdings belong to ESOP from being gobble up during the 
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mixed-ownership reform, Greenland set up Shanghai Gelinlan Company to control all the 
management and employees’ shareholdings in 2014, and the name “Gelinlan” is sounded similar to 
“Greenland” in Chinese. Shanghai Gelinlan controls 37.66 million yuan employees’ shareholdings, 
and account for 28.83% of the new Greenland Group after reorganization.  
 
Third Step: Reverse merger transaction with Jinfeng Investment (600606) 
According to the published transection plan, the reverse merger asset replacement happened first in 
the procedure, Jinfeng Investment was the shell company for Greenland Group. All of Jinfeng 
Investment’s assets (2.3 billion yuan) were replaced by equivalent amount of Greenland’s shares. 
After that, Jinfeng Investment issued 11.326 billion new shares additional targeted Greenland Group 
at 5.58 yuan per share in order to acquire 100% equity shareholdings of Greenland. The seasoned 
offering was about 63.2 billion yuan, and the total capital volume reached 66.5 billion yuan, and 
became the largest reverse merger transaction in China as a consequence. When the transection 
completed, none of the major shareholders, such as Shanghai Real Estate, Shanghai Municipal 
Investment Group and Shanghai Gelinlan Company could become control relationship with the new 
Greenland Group with less than 30% shareholdings, which means that Greenland would successfully 
become a mixed-ownership corporate from a typical state-owned enterprise.  
Chart 9 Equity structure after reverse merger Jinfeng Investment 
             
Source: ifeng.com 
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Section 3. Interview with Greenland Group manager 
In order to research theme, I had an in-depth interview with Greenland Group’s Office Director 
Xiaodong. Wang, who is managing affaires of boards of shareholders, directors and supervision, also 
responsible for administration affairs of the overall Group, including routine work, public relations, 
conference arrangement, custody classified documents and so on…it is like a“常務取締役” level 
position in Japanese company. Contents below contain Mr. Wang’s response and my supplements.   
 
1. What is the point of completing mixed-ownership reform and reverse merger for both 
Greenland Group itself and the capital market? 
 
This round of reorganization will update and deepen the Group’s mixed-ownership reform, and 
release enterprise’s vitality and competitive strength. Specifically, source advantages brought by 
different backgrounds shareholders’ would be highlighted, and the operational efficiency would 
increase through resources complementary and advantages assembling. Also, the mixed-ownership 
breaks up the old order in management and improves marketization process of those conservative 
state enterprises, consequently, their decision making would become more scientific, independent 
and flexible. Furthermore, more regulatory operation, incentive mechanism and information 
disclosure brought by mixed-ownership reform would make contribution to healthy development of 
large state enterprises. Right now, China is experiencing economy transition, so it is wise for 
Greenland to swim with the tide implementing initially rather than stay with the old-school thoughts 
and eliminated by the fierce market competition.   
China’s state-owned economy has particularities, most of SOEs are in pillar industries which 
indicates that we cannot simply copy the western countries ways or Japan’s way that private a whole 
state enterprise once and for all. Therefore, mixed-ownership is practical measure that fits national 
conditions. It ensures the dominant position of state assets in national economy, meanwhile, it 
exploits the advantages of marketization, efficient and flexible brought by mixed-ownership, fully 
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combined “state-owned system” with “market system” in order to release state assets’ influence and 
driving force. 
 
Noticeably, in capital market, Greenland’s reform is a triple-win for state assets, PE and ESOP, the 
continues rising of Jinfeng Investment share price brought great fortune since China Securities 
Regulatory approved the reverse merger transaction. According to the transaction announcement 
published by Jinfeng Investment(after the reverse merger has been completed), the total share 
volume is 11.8 billion, and by the end of 8th May, its stock price is has already become to 31.1 yuan, 
therefore, the overall market value of is 366.98 billion yuan, which will be largest real estate listed 
company in China. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC) 
controls 46.25% of the reorganized group shares through three corporates, so the value should be 
366.98*46.25%=169.7 billion yuan. Before this transaction, the SASAC held 60.68% of Greenland 
Group, and according to the official evaluation report, Greenland’s was estimated as 46.4 billion 
yuan, the shares value was 28.2 billion yuan consequently. At the same time, SASAC had 201 
million shares of Jinfeng Investment, about 1.06 billion yuan based on the 5.23 yuan per share 
before suspension. Therefore, the great capital appreciation for SASAC brought by the successfully 
reverse merger would be 169.7-28.2-1.06=140.44 billion yuan.  
 
Meanwhile, for the private equity companies, the smoothly transection bring them 7 times benefits 
compared with their costs. For instance, Pin An Innovation Venture Capital, Ningbo Hui Sheng Ju 
Zhi Capital and CDH paid 5.8 billion, 2.2 billion and 2.5 billion respectively for bidding Greenland 
shares at 5.62 yuan per share, and they each holds 10.01$, 3.86% and 4.3% of group shares after the 
transaction, hence, the market value of their shares have already become to 37 billion, 14.17 billion 
and 15 billion respectively.  
 
In terms of Gelinlan Company, which is the founded for management equity incentive, it holds 
28.83% of the reformed group shares, which is 366.98*28.83%=105.8 billion yuan. So each of the 
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982 members of Gelinlan Company will hold shares’ market value equivalent to 107.7 million yuan. 
 
2. Why Greenland decided to go public through reverse merger instead of IPO? 
What are the difficulties and obstructions during reverse merger process? 
 
It is quite a long and tortuous progress of Greenland’s going public. At first, Greenland Group had 
decided to go IPO in 2007, however, the unexpected financial crisis hindered the plan. And in 2008, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission announced to tighten the fundraising of real estate 
enterprises, and another document about tightening real estate companies financing through going 
public was issued in 2010, hence the attitude and policy of regulatory department break up dreams of 
real estate enterprises’ that raising enormous capital through IPO, and the influence last till now, so 
in some degree the Group has to chose reverse merger to achieve its goal.  
 
The Group’s complicated shareholding structure made the whole reverse merger transection a 
complex process. The state owned 51% shares of Greenland Group, and employees’ shareholding 
commission controlled 46% equities, which was considered as an obstructer to the transection. 
Meanwhile, its diversified business also made the process harder. The reorganization involved so 
many aspects, the interests allocation and balance required a considerable long time. In terms of 
technical operation, Greenland would transmit to Jinfeng Investment about 75billion yuan, and than, 
if the price of shell firm’s additional target issued stock was low, than the market share price would 
be low as well, which would lead to a loss of state assets; while if the additional issued stock price 
was quite high, than Greenland would replaced less shares which was not an expected outcome.  
 
3. Greenland Group chose PE firms as public investors rather than other kind of 
institutional investors, such as securities company, pension fund or insurance firm, so 
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what kind of advantages and impacts that PE shareholders will bring to the Group 
reform?  
 
Private equity firms are playing both financial investor and strategic investor role in Group’s 
operation. It is true that all of the institutional investors mentioned in the question can provide 
enough capital to financing the reform and business operation, and monitoring the board of director 
as major shareholders, whereas PE firms are more competitive in giving strategic advices. Generally, 
private firms have more professional manager teams, which have rich and professional capital 
operation experience, as well as corporate management experience. Private equity can effectively 
improve the management mechanism problems which existing in traditional state enterprises for 
long period, and this point is the biggest advantage that PE firms have. PE also provide other value 
added service, for example, global vision and resource, which would help Greenland Group expend 
overseas business with professional consulting advice. Moreover, PE firms could help improve the 
Group’s equity incentive system and salary system, to really participate into changing the old-school 
operational mode of Greenland Group, and that is what other investment institutions cannot do.  
 
I (Mr. Wang) believe you(the author) have noticed that it has become a trend in the market that listed 
companies cooperate with PE to establish industrial funds, and invited private firms as major 
shareholders might provide a chance for Greenland to consider about launching industrial fund with 
these PE companies.  
 
“Listed company +PE” industrial fund usually does equity investment in emerging industries or 
fixed investment projects, and exit ways include IPO, M&A, share transfer and share repurchase. 
Industrial fund’ investment themes contain venture capital, private equity, M&A, real estate fund 
and etc. Among these themes, “Listed company+PE” merger industrial fund gets most attention. A 
simply operational flow is as followed:  
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1) The listed company and PE firm co-financing establish the industrial fund, and listed 
company as LP, PE as GP.  
2) PE firm response to raise the rest capital that required by the merger.  
3) PE firm is in charge of the capital operation from evaluation to investment of merger projects.  
4) When is ripe for PE exiting from the project, PE transfer the project to listed company 
through this industrial fund and exit smoothly.  
 
According to CVSource database that from January 2014 to February 2015, 173 listed companies 
cooperated with PE establishing industrial funds, meaning that 6.6% of the overall A-share listed 
firms stated running this business in only one year (“Listed company+PE” industrial fund research 
report, 2015). This kind of new cooperate mode is a win-win for both listed company and PE firm. 
Traditional industries listed companies hope to promote transformation and updating through M&A, 
meanwhile, emerging industries firms hope to access and control the latest technology and industry 
dynamics, in order to improve its strategic layout by merger up/downstream relative companies. 
Moreover, the required transection capital can be financed through IPO or additional stock issuance. 
On PE firms’ aspect, sell the project to listed firms might release the exit pressure brought by low 
IPO issue rate. Furthermore, these years pre-IPO investment mode, which was an extremely popular 
investment method 2 or 3 years ago, experienced a significantly decline due to policies and market 
environment, thus PE firms have to find new investment method such as merger and acquisition. 
Another advantage that should be motioned is that it would be easier for PE firms raising money 
because this industrial fund have the listed companies’ reputation endorsement. 
 
4. Recently, a majority of people in Mainland China and Taiwan are attracted to invest real 
estate in Japan, therefore, as the largest international real estate company in China, what 
is Greenland’s next step in expedition abroad business? 
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In 2014 Greenland’s overseas business experienced a boost that achieved 467% increase compared 
to 2013, and earned15.3 billion yuan foreign sales business, Greenland Group has already become 
the largest real estate group in the world. Group’s goal in 2015 is pursuing 30 billion yuan foreign 
sale earnings and keeping the competitive advantages in overseas business. Greenland Group pays 
lots of attention the demands of people that invest in foreign real estate, therefore, in order to provide 
better service for these clients, Group decides to launch a one-stop platform including house 
purchasing, immigration, education, medical treatment and other service. As we known that during 
the abroad property purchasing process, there are plenty of uncertain risks that effect investor’s 
decision. For instance, capital risk, which might caused by unqualified property agencies; profit risk, 
leading by unprofessional evaluation and other influence factors; legal risk, that investors are not 
familiar with foreign laws, and the last management risk, meaning that it is hard to manage your 
overseas property remotely. In additional, psychologically, people will always trust their domestic 
companies when dealing with foreign affairs. Hence, Greenland Group’s one-stop platform provides 
full range of service for Chinese investors on purchasing properties abroad. And the platform has 
sign the cooperation contrast with 14 famous companies in education, travelling, legal, medical and 
other industries so that to give investors full range of consulting advises about living abroad.   
Chart 10 14 companies that cooperate with one-stop service platform 
                 
Source: http://house.baidu.com/ 
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Section 4. Interview with Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission officer  
All of the state-owned enterprises are under the control of Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission, which make reform plan and leads enterprises’ reorganization turn 
to mixed-ownership. Thus, I believe it is necessary to interview and relevant officer in Shanghai 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC) so that to have more 
comprehensive perspective on the state enterprises reform issue. Fortunately, I had a chance to 
discuss with a highly relevant officer who works in SASAC State-Owned Enterprise Reform 
Department, whereas the name and position of this officer is kept classified in this dissertation 
because of certain government information disclosure policies.  
 
1. What are Shanghai government’s perspectives on the current round of state-owned 
enterprise reform? What kinds of results that government expects to achieve during 
leading state enterprises implementing reform? 
 
Shanghai government has already published guidance on local state enterprises’ reform, and 
according to the guidance, the government hopes to improve SOEs’ management mechanism; reduce 
administration interference on corporate governance; and increase enterprise vitality and competitive 
strength. As you know that we SASAC pay more attention in state assets management rather than 
concrete corporate governance, so the government determines to clarify its responsibilities that exits 
state assets from SOEs generally and delegates decision power reducing administration interference 
on enterprise internal management. At the same time, the government hope to optimize state assets’ 
strategic layouts through this round of reform, centralizing resources and inclining policies in order 
to allocate 80% of state assets centralized in strategic emerging industry, advanced manufacturing 
industry and modern service industry. The government will guide SOEs become more professional, 
international and market-orientated during the reform. In addition, the government encourages SOEs 
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establish effective incentive system, improve the outdated and rigescent salary system so that to 
motive employees’ internal innovation. For those competitive industries enterprises, the pay should 
adjust to “base+performance bonus+long-term incentives”; while for public utilities enterprises, 
besides the “base+performance bonus” salary, there will be particular bonus based on appraised 
assignment. To sum up, the government concentrates on better managing and allocating the 
enormous amount of state assets that exist in all of state enterprises, meanwhile, the government will 
release authority on supervising and interfering corporate daily operation in order to help SOEs build 
modern corporate system during the reform process, stimulate SOEs improving competitive and 
effective initially and reasonable for profits or losses in the market indecently rather than rely on 
governance subsidies, which is inappropriate in market economy.  
 
2. None of the SOEs which implemented mixed-ownership reform involved foreign capital as 
major shareholder through there were many famous and experienced investment 
institutions participating the biddings, so what is the government’s attitude to allow 
foreign capital participating into the reform? It seems that foreign capital actually is 
prohibited so far.  
 
There is no prohibition or discrimination on foreign capital participating into SOE reform, the 
government’s perspective on the current round of reform is to reduce administration interference and 
increase enterprises independent governance, obviously there will be no government provision for 
foreign capital institutions. Furthermore, what is the most needed thing for state enterprises right 
now? Absolutely is not money since it is easy for SOEs financing from banks due to their “state” 
reputation endorsement. Corporate governance is the first thing that SOEs confusing about. Board of 
shareholders, board of directors and management, how to allocate reasonably and manage 
scientifically on these three division? In deed they are illustrated clearly in every Article of 
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Association, whereas no one truly deal with these affairs properly especially during the transition 
process from traditional to modern corporate system. The seconded concern is management 
incentives, which is also the hardest one. Incentive system diversified based on different industries 
and enterprises, there are so many variables have to be considered. For example, it should be profits 
oriented, investment return oriented or market share oriented? The wrong performance examine 
standards might lead to disaster results. And strategy is the third concern, some state enterprises are 
in good condition now, however they worried about if wrong decisions are made in the future, such 
as a suddenly major merger or enormous investment, would drag the company to a terrible situation. 
Dealing with all of above confusing required deep and comprehensive understanding of the 
enterprise, and rich and effective experience as well, those fully-fledged foreign capital institutions 
are very welcomed to help Chinese SOEs on operation and development.  
 
On the other hand, enterprises are also under the pressure from the public and media, if there are too 
many questions on projects sensibility from external, the corporates’ decision definitely will be 
effected, hence in some sensitive industries foreign capital is not encouraged to enter.  
 
Few foreign capital institutions won the bid because the enterprise would choose the ones that most 
match its situation requirement rather than just picked up some “big names” PE firms to impress the 
public. As the major shareholders of state enterprises, the private capital are supposed to help SOE 
fix operational problem and centralize resource for development, if they exist just as vaunting affairs 
but helpless, that is totally deviation from the original intension of mixed-ownership reform, thus 
there is no prejudice or discrimination on whether domestic or foreign capital, everything is 
considered from reality.  
 
Although the government official attitude is equally treating domestic and foreign capital 
institutions, the reality reveals another view. Foreign capital like Goldman Sacks earned billions 
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dollars during state enterprises’ sold equities first time ten years ago, in the current round of reform, 
the government seems to let domestic investment institutions take biggest piece of cake 
intentionally. When Sinopec sold its oil retail unit 17.5 billion dollars equities in 2014, foreign firms 
such as KKR and Ontario Teacher Pensions Plan participated the bid but all failed the competition. 
96% of equities are sold to mainland and Hong Kong investment institutions. In August 2014, China 
Huarong Asset Management Company decided to involve strategic investors before it went public, 
only one foreign PE firm entered the finalist--Warburg Pincus LLC, which was attributed to the help 
of American Finance Minister.  
 
These facts indicate that the governance might determine to complete the reform almost without 
foreign capital, SOE equities might be sold to domestic firms even at a lower price. According to a 
report published by Stanford C. Bernstein that Sinopec retail unit was sold 20% lower than the 
expectation price. The government had promised to encourage private firms to enter state enterprises 
monopolized industries such as oil and electricity, however it did not mean foreign capital is also 
encouraged. Sinopec claimed on the finalist announcement day that it would give preference to 
domestic institutions and those could " benefit the public" ones. In addition, another concern of the 
government is the possible conflicts between employees and foreign capital. As profits chasers, 
foreign PE firms might implement massive layoff plans through the reorganization, however a 
suddenly mess unemployment without pension and compensation would become a threat to the 
social stability, therefore, the government and SOEs both want to avoid from generating this kind of 
conflict.    
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
This paper made a research on the current round state-owned enterprises reform using a typical SOE 
Greenland Group’s reform as a case study. Now China is during the period of economy transition, 
and implementing state-owned enterprises reform is a necessary method to improve its economy 
transition smoothly. Most of previous studies focus on SOE reform happened ten years ago, while 
few scholars make researches on the current round of reform that started from last year. Moreover, 
this round of reform encourages private equity firms participating is new thoughts for China market, 
indicating fewer studies are related about this latest topic. This paper combines both the reform and 
PE’s participating, researches on what kinds of effects that private equity can bring to SOEs during 
mixed-ownership reform, fills the gap of lacking studies on the current round of reform.        
 
In order to research the topic, the author interviewed highly relevant officers in Greenland Group 
and Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, research questions 
include the perspective of implementing this round of SOE reform, the effects of private equity on 
overall corporate governance and the concerns about foreign capital’s participation in the reform. 
Based on the given answers, the author draw conclusions as below. The current round of state 
enterprises reform is a necessary move during China’s economy transition. Updating and deepening 
the SOE reform contribute to releasing enterprises’ vitality and increase competitiveness; traditional 
SOEs are expected to become more marketable, competitive and profitable through this reform; and 
the government hopes to complete state assets’ smoothly exiting from SOEs during the 
mixed-ownership reform in order to encourage SOEs developing indecently and healthily.   
 
As strategic investor, PE is expected to help SOE fix mismanagement problems during and after the 
mixed-ownership reform. Generally PE firms have rich experience and professional manager teams 
in dealing internal management problems, that the reason that most of state enterprises choose them 
rather than other investment institutions, and PE firms are supposed to help enterprises improve 
internal governance, build modern corporate system, optimize management incentive and salary 
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systems, furthermore, based on the current market condition, enterprises might cooperate with PE 
establishing industrial funds so that to improve industrial integration. In addition, the international 
recourses and advantages of PE firms also benefit SOEs on expanding overseas. At last, although the 
government’s official attitude is very welcoming foreign capital participating into SOE reform, the 
facts reveal an opposite signal that domestic PE firms are more preferred than foreign ones. We have 
to admit that there are many concerns about foreign capital’s participation, such as state asset loss, 
employment conflicts, more important, since state enterprises are usually centralized in national 
pillar and sensitive industries, the government might not allow foreign capital having great speaking 
rights in decision making process.    
 
Three main limitations exist in this paper. The first limitation of this paper is limited literature 
reference. The current round of SOE reform has just begun since 2014, and with PE participation 
can be called an “innovation” in SOE reform history, therefore, there are enough academic 
researches can be directly referenced in this dissertation. Furthermore, state enterprises reform is a 
social problem with Chinese characteristic rather than a general worldwide topic, indicating that 
there are limited references for study this topic deeply.  
 
In terms of research method, no data is collected for doing quantitative tests in this paper because the 
Greenland Group has not finished the listing process through the reverse merger transection had 
already completed, still as a private company, the Greenland Group did not publish annual reports or 
other financial figures to the public. In addition, quantitative tests of this kind of topic usually 
requires date for totally about fives years before and after the event happened, thus it is impossible to 
run any data regression in the current period.  
 
At last, in the case study part, only interview method is used because observation and survey are not 
effective method in researching this case under the current condition, with a single research method 
might not confirm totally objective conclusions. Furthermore, answers of some research questions in 
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the interview with Greenland Group could not be provided due to information sensitivity, for 
example, “Were there any foreign private equity firms participate into the bidding when Greenland 
issued shared targeting non-state capital investors in 2013”, and this would effect the author research 
the case comprehensively.   
 
Subsequent work might research the relevant topic through a quantitative method, collect qualified 
data when it is available, and run regression testing profitability, efficiency and other ratios to study 
the effects of PE during the reform. The development and impacts of “Listed company+PE” merger 
industrial funds might also be a further research topic suggested by the author.   
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